laws in force? (2) If they did, was this epicheirotonia the procedure laid down in the document quoted at Dem. 24.20-23? A positive answer to the first question is compatible with a negative answer to the second. On the other hand, a negative answer entails that the document inserted into the speech at 20-23 must be "a late forgery".
There can be no doubt that the Athenians at the ekklesia held on eleven Hekatombaion 353/352 did conduct an epicheirotonia about the laws in force (Dem. 24.26) and that it took the form of a diacheirotonia whether the laws in force were satisfactory or a new law must be introduced (Dem. 24.25). In his new article Canevaro agrees: "Demosth. or. 24.25 expressly describes one single διαχειροτονία 'on whether new laws need to be proposed, or the existing laws are deemed to be satisfactory'."3 But he now insists that such a vote was not an annual event. Canevaro holds that a diacheirotonia about the laws was conducted whenever a new nomos was on the agenda of an ekklesia.4 He concludes:
"The whole procedure of nomothesia seems to be designed to ensure as much caution as possible, in a variety of institutional settings and with as many hurdles as possible, on the possibility of enacting a new law. It is not surprising that the Athenians should impose a preliminary vote even for initiating the procedure."5 That is in my opinion unlikely. It makes sense once every year to have a diacheirotonia about the entire corpus of nomoi in force. It does not make sense to have such a diacheirotonia whenever a bill which the boule must have approved was submitted to the demos. Let me refer to, e.g., the law about approvers of silver coins proposed and carried by Nikophon, an otherwise unknown citizen.6 First he must have approached the boule, which approved his proposal, whereafter the probouleuma was placed on the agenda of an ekklesia and probably one in which the demos had to debate three matters about religion, three about foreign policy and three about secular business.7 According to Canevaro this item on the agenda of the Assembly was opened with a diacheirotonia whether to allow the bill to be debated and referred to a session of nomothetai or alternatively to declare that the existing laws sufficed. If the demos voted for the alternative, that would be the end of the matter and the council's probouleuma would be dismissed without any debate and vote in the ekklesia.
In his monograph "The Documents in the Attic Orators" Canevaro rejected the document at Dem. 24.20-23 as a late forgery8 and "proposed a new reconstruction of the fourth-century nomothesia procedures that did not involve an annual review of all the laws, and allowed instead for the enactment of new laws at all points of the year"9. His reconstruction is in seven points, and both I and other scholars who before Canevaro have published about Athenian nomothesia agree with this reconstruction as far as it goes:
Re. 1: We acknowledge that new laws could be passed by the nomothetai throughout the year,10 and that there was a preliminary vote in the Assembly preceded by a probouleuma of the Council.11 Re. 2: When the passing of a nomos had been approved by the Council and the Assembly, bills had to be posted before the eponymoi.12 Re. 3: These bills were read out to the Assembly.13 It should be added that in the preparatory phase bills were also debated in the ekklesia.14 Re. 4: Nomothetai were not appointed immediately after a bill had been approved by the demos but in a later meeting of the Assembly.15 Re. 5: Laws conflicting with the bill approved by the demos had to be repealed.16 Re. 6: Expert synegoroi were elected to defend those laws that had to be repealed in connection with the enactment of new laws.17 Re. 7: A proposer of a law who omitted any of these regulations could be prosecuted by a graphe nomon me epitedeion theinai.18 However, this reconstruction of the Athenian nomothesia in the fourth century does not preclude that at the beginning of the year there was a diacheirotonia about the corpus of laws in which the demos had to choose between accepting the laws as they were or voting that a new law or new laws must be passed.
In the second chapter of his article Canevaro sets out three methodological principles:
"1) the documents must be compared with the orators' paraphrases and comments […] . 2) Problems in the texts of the documents cannot a priori be removed by means of transpositions, emendations, and deletions […] . 3) 'Documents should conform to the language, style and conventions of Classical Athenian inscriptions of the same type […] The presence in a document of words or expressions never found in similar Attic inscriptions, or in any Attic inscription at all, casts serious doubts on the document's authenticity'."19 I have problems with how Canevaro applies his third principle.20 "Classical Athenian inscriptions" must cover the period from 508/507 to 322/321. "Of the same type" is a rather vague delimitation. It may be understood in a broad sense and include all laws and decrees passed by the demos, the boule and the nomothetai.
That is apparently what Canevaro has in mind. In my opinion, to insist on having parallels in contemporary Attic inscriptions is a dangerous method to use in this case,21 because the epigraphical evidence at our disposal is both restricted and biased. From the fourth century when nomoi were passed by the nomothetai we have a plethora of honorific decrees and many decrees about foreign policy,22 whereas very few nomoi are preserved on stone,23 and the few we have mostly regulate a specific matter such as approvers of silver coins,24 transportation and storage of public grain from the klerouchies to Athens,25 repairs on the walls of Piraeus,26 regulation of the Panathenaia.27 For the fifth century the closest we get to a law about the workings of the political institutions is the fragmentary law regulating the powers of the Council of Five Hundred vis-à-vis the Assembly (IG I 3 105), and from the fourth century we possess only one epigraphically transmitted nomos that treats constitutional matters, i.e. the law threatening the Areopagos in the event of a plot against the democracy.28 Thus, there is no proper parallel at all to the laws on legislation found in "Against Timokrates" 20-23 and 33.29 Canevaro responds that "honorary decrees, laws and international treaties of the same period use for instance the same dating formulas, the same calendar (for the period we are concerned with, the bouleutic calendar), and the same grammatical structures and terms to convey the same meanings"30. But it is noteworthy that all these parallels occur in the prescripts of the psephismata, not a single one deals with the substance of the laws and decrees.
I shall adduce two examples to illustrate the problems created by Canevaro's insistence that "the terms found in the documents inserted in the speeches must always be attested in similar documents preserved epigraphically" and that "the presence in a document of words or expressions never found in similar Attic inscriptions, or in any Attic inscription at all, casts serious doubts on the document's authenticity"31.
A law about reprieve for atimoi and opheilontes is read out to the jurors at Dem. 24.45. It stipulates that no proposal about reprieve can be debated unless the majority of a quorum of 6.000 Athenians in a secret vote have given their permission (ἐὰν μὴ ψηφισαμένων ᾿Αθηναίων τὴν ἄδειαν πρῶτον μὴ ἔλαττον ἑξακισχιλίων οἷς ἂν δόξῃ κρύβδην ψηφιζομένοις). Canevaro's stichometric investigation shows that this document was part of the "Urexemplar".32 In language and content it matches Demosthenes' paraphrase of the law at 46, and Canevaro accepts the law as an authentic document. Looking for parallels in Attic inscriptions we find three attestations of κρύβδην ψηφίζεσθαι,33 but not a single one of the number of voters. The numeral ἑξακισχίλιοι is unattested in Attic inscriptions. The three inscriptions referring to a secret vote were passed by civic subdivisions where of course the number 6.000 is irrelevant. But what about citizenship decrees? From ca. 385 B.C. and down to ca. 229 B.C. a citizen decree passed by the demos had to be ratified in the following ekklesia by the people voting by ballot cf e.g. IG II 2 109.51-54 with SEG 16.47: τὴν δὲ ψῆφον δο͂ ναι περὶ αὐτῶν τὸς πρυτάνεις τὸς μετὰ τὴν Ἀκαμαντίδα πρυτανεύοντας ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ ἐκκλησίᾳ.34 Here too there is no reference to a quorum of 6.000 nor to the provision that it has to be a secret vote. But both requirements are mentioned at Dem. 59.89-90. Following Canevaro I accept the document at Dem. 24.45 as genuine, but I note that we have accepted a document as authentic although there is no parallel in Attic inscriptions for some of the key terms in the law. Canevaro's comment is: "ἑξακισχίλιοι, attested or not, is the only way to say six thousand in Greek, so it would be ridiculous to consider it a mark of forgery because it is unattested in inscriptions -if we had an inscription with the number six thousand spelled out it would have ἑξακισχίλιοι."35 But that is just an attempt to evade the problem that a document he accepts as authentic includes important terms that are not attested in inscriptions: both the number of voters and the prescription that it is a secret vote, not a vote by show of hands.
My other example is about αὔριον. According to Canevaro:
"Hansen's second example is similarly misleading. It is the document with the so-called decree of Epicrates at Demosth. Or. 24.28. I judge this document a forgery (and Hansen concurs), and one of the several problems I find is that the document expresses the meaning 'tomorrow' with αὔριον alone, which is perfectly acceptable in ordinary Greek, but is never found in inscriptions, where we always find (174 examples) αὔριον preceded by εἰς (or ἐς) to mean, adverbially, 'tomorrow'."36
To say that αὔριον alone "is perfectly acceptable in ordinary Greek" is an exaggeration if we focus on the sources that are relevant in this context. In the speeches there are altogether seven occurrences of αὔριον. We have εἰς αὔριον twice (Aeschin. 2.46 and 53)37, we have ἡ αὔριον ἡμέρα twice (Lys. Or. 26.6; Hyp. 1 fr. 3.9) and αὔριον twice (Antiph. 6.21; Dem. 24.28). The seventh attestation is in the document at Dem. 24.27. Now, in inscriptions all the attestations of εἰς or ἐς αὔριον occur in invitations to dinner in the Prytaneion tomorrow: καλέσαι ἐπὶ δεῖπνον εἰς τὸ πρυτανεῖον εἰς αὔριον. We have 174 repetitions of one formula. Furthermore Canevaro seems to have overlooked one source, viz. IG Ι 3 118 where αὔριον appears twice: first alone in 38-40: [ἐ]χσαλεῖφσαι τὰ ὀνόμα[τα] τōν ὁμέ̣ [ρ]ον τōν Σελυμ[β]ριανōν καὶ ----ōν ἐγγυε[τōν] αὐτōν [α]ὔριον τὸν γραμ[ματ]έα τε͂ ς βολε͂ ς and again at 46-47 in the usual phrase: καλέσαι ἐς π[ρυτανεῖον ἐπὶ χσένια ἐς αὔριον. Moreover Demosthenes' paraphrase at 24.28 is: αὐτὸς ἔγραψεν αὔριον νομοθετεῖν, indicating that in the document the secretary had just read out to the people (not the document inserted at 28) the term used was αὔριον alone.
In his introduction Canevaro has the following objection to how I treat the relation between the inserted documents and Demosthenes' paraphrases.
"Because there is an a priori presumption that the paraphrases are normally reliable but no presumption whatsoever that the non-stichometric documents are authentic, then the only sensible way to assess the reliability of a document must be to start from the paraphrases (tested against further external evidence), and not from the document itself.
[…] The alternative -the method used by Hansen in his analysis -is to start with the document, to reconstruct the law or decree (in this case the procedure of nomothesia) on the basis of the document, and then to use that reconstruction as a check for his reading of the paraphrase […]. I disagree with his analysis […] ."38 My response is that in so far as one with an open mind compares the information provided by the document with the orator's paraphrase and with other information it makes no difference whether you start with the document and then compare with the paraphrase or whether you start with the paraphrases and compare with the document. I find it alarming to insist on starting with the paraphrases -believing a priori that they are reliable -and then afterwards to examine the document -expecting to find that it is a forgery.
3. In chapter 3 entitled "Reconstructing the nomothesia: reading the evidence" Canevaro states that in his monograph he "identified four key and decisive differences between the procedure described in the document at Demosth. or 24.20-3 and the information about nomothesia found in the paraphrase of the same speech and in other sources (oratorical and epigraphic)".39
First, Canevaro quotes his summary. I confess that my reading of the evidence differs from Canevaro's, and in my article I quoted his summary adding in angle brackets what is missing according to my reading of the sources: "There are major differences between the document and Demosthenes' accounts in this speech [Against Timokrates] and in the Against Leptines. (1) The procedure described by Demosthenes is one for enacting new laws <or accepting the laws as they are>, whereas the document provides for an annual vote of approval <or disapproval> of the entire 'code' of laws and <in the latter case> for the rejection of some <that then must be replaced by revised versions or new laws>. (2) Demosthenes describes a preliminary vote to allow new proposals (plural) to be made <and does not mention that the vote was taken section by section>, whereas the document describes a vote of approval for <or disapproval of> the existing laws section by section. (3) The document sets this vote of approval <or disap-proval> in the 11 th day of the first prytany of every year and provides, in case some laws are not approved, for the appointment of the nomothetai following a discussion in "the last of the three Assemblies." <There is no mention of the other laws about nomothesia which laid down the procedures for having laws changed or added later in the year>. Demosthenes, on 38 Canevaro 2018, 77 f. 39 Canevaro 2018, 82. the other hand, supported by the epigraphical evidence, shows that the nomothetai could be appointed at any point of the year. (4) The document provides for the election of five synegoroi in the same Assembly on the 11 th of the first prytany. Demosthenes, on the other hand, <has nothing to say about when the synegoroi were elected but may imply> that they were appointed later after the proposals for new laws had been presented."40
In chapter 3.2 Canevaro deals with the issue of "An annual ἐπιχειροτονία τῶν νόμων as a set item on the agenda of the Assembly?": "Hansen's statement that 'neither Timokrates nor anybody else had approached the boule about a new law concerning the Panathenaia to be debated at the ekklesia', on the basis of which he argues that the ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν νόμων was a mandatory item on the agenda that did not require an ad hoc probouleuma, is thus incorrect. The passage says nothing about how the ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν νόμων on the ll th of Hekatombaion came to be on the agenda, because it talks about the events of the 12 th ."41 This interpretation of the passage is only possible because Canevaro prefers the reading καθέζεσθαι (to sit down, to attend a meeting viz. the session of nomothetai on the 12th). But that is an emendation suggested by Blass. All manuscripts have καθίζεσθαι (to convene a meeting), and that is retained in the new OCT of Dilts. Thus the proper interpretation of the passage διαπραξάμενος μετὰ τῶν ὑμῖν ἐπιβουλευόντων καθίζεσθαι νομοθέτας διὰ ψηφίσματος ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν Παναθηναίων προφάσει is: "Because in collusion with those who plot against you he had managed to convene the nomothetai through a psephisma allegedly about the Panathenaia" viz. the decree proposed and carried on the 11th. Contrary to his second methodological principle Canevaro accepts an emendation to the reading in all manuscripts. At 24.29 on the other hand, where the reference is to the meeting on the 12th, two of the best manuscripts (A and Y) have καθεζομένων, and that is read by Dilts inter alios.
Next:
"Because the ἐπιχειροτονία τῶν νόμων was not on the agenda of the Assembly on the 11 th of Hekatombaion following a probouleuma of the council,42 then, according to Hansen, it must follow that it was a set item on the agenda of that particular first Assembly meeting of the year."43
And:
"The paraphrase (as I have argued and as we shall see) describes one single διαχειροτονία, not multiple διαχειροτονίαι, and later refers to that one διαχειροτονία using the verb ἐπιχɛιροτονεῖν."44 I agree, but with the addendum that this view does not exclude the possibility that this dia-or epicheirotonia was conducted in four steps as described in the document. Canevaro devotes 95-99 to an analysis of Aischines' description at 3.38-40 of how the thesmothetai were involved in nomothesia, and he claims that I misinterpret the passage "and misread the details of Aischines' account" (95). I wrote:
"Aischines paraphrases a law that requires the thesmothetai to keep an eye on the laws of Athens: if they find invalid laws in the corpus, or inconsistent laws, or more than one law on the same point, the relevant laws are to be put before the people, who will set up a board of nomothetai to settle the matter. This inspection of the corpus of laws must be undertaken every year. The prytaneis are requested to summon an ekklesia where nomothetai are an item on the agenda, and, as in the ekklesia held on Hekatombaion 11, the procedure is introduced by a diacheirotonia.45 To have an annual inspection of the laws in force in order to eliminate invalid laws and conflicting laws is parallel to having an annual inspection of the laws in order to decide whether new laws are needed."46 Next, criticizing my interpretation as a "misreading" Canevaro writes:
"Notice that the passage does not prescribe a specific procedure to be held every year, with fixed steps (and a vote in the Assembly) and a fixed time to revise or amend the laws."47 My view was -and still is -that the thesmothetai are in fact instructed by law48 every year to inspect the laws (sc. all the laws) and if they find instances of conflicting laws or invalid laws or more laws about the same matter, they must have them published before the eponymoi. Then the law instructs the prytaneis to summon an ekklesia about nomothetai and here the epistates ton proedron must conduct a vote (diacheirotonia) about the instances published before the eponymoi whereby some laws are repealed, others upheld: τοὺς μὲν ἀναιρεῖν τῶν νόμων τοὺς δὲ καταλείπειν. Note the plural both about the abrogated and the vindicated laws. The thesmothetai do not arrange to have an ekklesia and a session of nomothetai whenever they find an instance of a dubious law. They gather together the instances they find in consequence of their obligatory investigation, which indicates that it was an annual event. There are, however, problems with the passage: what does ἐπιγράψαντας νομοθέτας mean? What does the δῆμος vote about in the διαχειροτονία? Who are the subjects of the infinitives ἀναιρεῖν and καταλείπειν?
The traditional view has been that ἐπιγράψαντας νομοθέτας means "to place νομοθέται on the agenda of the ἐκκλησία", viz. that the διαχειροτονία is a vote about appointing νομοθέται, and that it is the νομοθέται who are the subject of ἀναιρεῖν and καταλείπειν.49 In 2000, however, Marcel Piérart argued "que le phrase ποιεῖν ἐκκλησίαν ἐπιγράψαντας νομοθέτας ne peut signifier autre chose que convoquer une assemblée en ecrivant sur 'la convocation' nomothètes". And his translation of the passage is: "Les prytanes convoqueront une assemblée intitulée 'nomothètes'. L'epistate de proèdres fera decider par un vote à main levée entre les lois à abroger et celles à conserver […] ."50 Thus, on this occasion the ekklesia is transformed into a session of nomothetai, the issue which laws to keep and which to abrogate is decided by the diacheirotonia and the subject of the infinitives is the demos. In 2003 Peter Rhodes responded51 and defending the traditional view he argued that "the accusative [ἐπιγράψαντας νομοθέτας] could well be (just as Dobre's dative has been thought to be) a way of saying 'putting nomothetai on the agenda', and there is no reason to think that it must mean labelling it (sc. an Assembly of) nomothetai"52. As his conclusion Rhodes states: "I do not think that Aischin 3.39 identifies the nomothetai with the ekklesia, no matter whether we retain the manuscripts' ἐπιγράψαντας νομοθέτας (as I think we should) or emend with Dobre to ἐπιγράψαντας νομοθέταις."53 Canevaro, however, still prefers Piérart's interpretation. He takes the understood subject of ἀναιρεῖν and καταλείπειν to be the δῆμος and holds that the ἐπιχειροτονία in this case is "the final conclusive vote […], not a preliminary vote"54. In my opinion there is no subject of the infinitives ἀναιρεῖν and καταλείπειν and no subject is needed.55 But if Piérart and Canevaro are right, that would be the only source we possess in which the people in assembly are labelled nomothetai and instructed to act as a session of nomothetai and pass nomoi. In my opinion that is most unlikely.
Canevaro takes issue with my interpretation of the epicheirotonia tån nomon conducted at the ekklesia held on the eleventh day of the first prytany. He holds that the epicheirotonia was just a general vote on whether a new law must be introduced or the laws in force were sufficient and he rejects my view that a decision "that a new law must be introduced"56 could be followed by a debate about necessary amendments of specific laws.
"First of all, there is nothing in the paraphrase that confirms that Timocrates, after a first vote on the laws but before a second vote on individual laws, talked about the law on the Panathenaia. Hansen cites three passages as evidence of this, all out of context, and all referring to different stages of the procedure: Demosth. or. 24.26: ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν Παναϑηναίων προφάσει; Demosth. or. 24.28: ἵνʼ ὡς κάλλιστα γένοιτό τι τῶν περὶ τὴν ἑορτήν; Demosth. or. 24.29: περὶ μὲν τούτων, τῆς διοικήσεως καὶ τῶν Παναϑηναίων οὔτε χείρονʼ οὔτε βελτίω νόμον οὐδένʼεἰσήνεγκεν οὐδείς. The second and the third quotes refer respectively to the decree of appointment of the nomothetai and to the actual session of the nomothetai, so have nothing to do with the so-called ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν νόμων of the 11 th of Hekatombaion. The first passage, Demost. or. 24.26, also clearly refers to the debate that led to the enactment of the decree of appointment of the nomothetai (καϑέζεσϑαι νομοϑέτας διὰ ψηφίσματος ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν Παναϑηναίων προφάσει). Thus, pace Hansen, all the relevant passages clearly set the discussion of the deficiencies of the law about the Panathenaia in the context of the enactment of the decree of the appointment of the nomothetai […]. "57 I hold that Canevaro's attempt to associate these three passages with the session of the nomothetai on Hekatombaion 12 is misleading. The first passage at 26 shows that Timokrates' alleged grounds for having the nomothetai summoned on the following day was concern for the Παναθήναια, a concern emphasized in the second passage at 28. Furthermore, at Dem. 24.26 Canevaro has καθέζεσθαι νομοθέτας referring to the session of nomothetai on 12 Hekatombaion, whereas all manuscripts have καθίζεσθαι referring to the summoning of the nomothetai on 11 Hekatombaion. As stated above: contrary to his method Canevaro has accepted 56 Hansen 2016, 452. 57 Canevaro 2018, 103. I quote a fuller version of the three passages: Demosth. or. 24.26: διαπραξάμενος μετὰ τῶν ὑμῖν ἐπιβουλευόντων καθίζεσθαι νομοθέτας διὰ ψηφίσματος ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν Παναθηναίων προφάσει. 24.28 ἐνθυμήθητε ἀναγιγνωσκομένου τοῦ ψηφίσματος ὡς τεχνικῶς ὁ γράφων αὐτὸ τὴν διοίκησιν καὶ τὸ τῆς ἑορτῆς προστησάμενος κατεπεῖγον, ἀνελὼν τὸν ἐκ τῶν νόμων χρόνον, αὐτὸς ἔγραψε αὔριον νομοθετεῖν. 24.29 καθεζομένων γὰρ τῶν νομοθετῶν περὶ μὲν τούτων, τῆς διοικήσεως καὶ τῶν Παναθηναίων, οὔτε χείρον´ οὔτε βελτίω νόμον οὐδέν´ εἰσήνεγκεν οὐδείς. the emendation of the term attested in all manuscripts.58 I conclude that in order to have the psephisma about the session of nomothetai passed Timokrates and his associates must have addressed the demos in consequence of the diacheirotonia about the nomoi and referred to the necessity to have one of the nomoi about the Panathenaia amended. Now the demos voted to summon a session of nomothetai on 12 Hekatombaion. But the next day the bill Timokrates submitted to the nomothetai was about public debtors, and there is nothing about the Panathenaia: τῷ δὲ οὐκ ἀπέχρησε τοῦτ' ἀδικεῖν μόνον εἰ μὴ δοθείσης τῆς ἀδείας λέγει καὶ νόμον εἰσφέρει περὶ τούτων59, ἀλλὰ καὶ προσέτ' οὐκ εἰς τὴν βουλὴν, οὐκ εἰς τὸν δῆμον εἰπὼν περἰ τούτων οὐδέν, ἐν παραβύστῳ, τῆς βουλῆς ἀφειμένης, τῶν δ ἄλλων διὰ τὴν ἑορτὴν ἱερομηνίαν ὰγόντων λάθρα τὸν νόμον εἰσήνεγκεν.60
In chapter 3.2 Canevaro debates my view of an annual epicheirotonia as a set item on the agenda of the Assembly:
"Hansen states 'that neither Timokrates nor anybody else had approached the boule about a new law concerning the Panathenaia to be debated at the ekklesia'. Because the ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν νόμων was not on the agenda of the Assembly on the 11 th of Hekatombaion following a probuleuma of the council, then, according to Hansen, it must follow that it was a set item on the agenda of that particular first Assembly meeting of the year. The problem with this argument is that it takes no account of the context in which the statement is found. The context makes it clear that the mention of the lack of a probouleuma is connected to the proposal of Timokrates and to the Assembly meeting of the 12 th of Hekatom-baion61, and not to that of the 11 th , and therefore tells us nothing about whether there was a probouleuma for the vote on the 11 th .62 Hansen's statement 'that neither Timokrates nor anybody else had approached the boule about a new law concerning the Panathenaia to be debated at the ekklesia', on the basis of which he argues that the epicheirotonia ton nomon was a mandatory item on the agenda that did not require an ad hoc bouleuma, is thus incorrect. The passage says nothing about how the epicheirotonia ton nomon of the 11 th of Hekatombaion came to be on the agenda, because it talks about the events of the 12 th ."63 58 Supra p. 10. 59 περὶ τούτων "about these matters" refers to ὀφειλοντων and ὀφληματος in the document at 24.45 cf. Canevaro 2018, 91. But on page 90 there are problems with Canevaro's interpretation. According to Canevaro the passage I "misunderstand" and "read out of context" is Dem. 24.48. But in the next sentence "in the passage" refers to Dem. 24.29, and it is from that passage I infer that the epicheirotonia was a fixed item on the agenda: "[…] neither Timokrates nor anybody else had approached the boule about a new law concerning the Panathenaia to be debated in the ekklesia. The epicheirotonia on Hekatombaion 11 cannot have been held in consequence of Timokrates' wish to have the law on the Panathenaia changed, and the presumption is that it was an obligatory item on the agenda for the first meeting of the year, and that Timokrates made use of the opportunity to propose his law when the demos in the epicheirotonia had voted that the laws in force did not suffice and that a new law was needed."64
The last part of Canevaro's paper treats problems with individual features of the document at Dem. 24.20-23.65 In this section he rejects my objections against eight specific problems that he identified with the wording of the document.
(1)66 Canevaro still prefers Harris' interpretation of μετὰ τὰ ἱερὰ with ἱερά meaning "after the sacrifices", and he rejects my interpretation: "after the sacred business." According to Harris we must distinguish between τὰ ἱερά with the article (referring to the sacrifices at the opening of the ἐκκλησία) and ἱερά without the article (referring to the sacred business on the agenda).67 But the distinction breaks down in the face of IG II 2 74.9 [πρώτῳ μ]εθ´ ἱερά. It is also disproved by the frequent occurrence in Hellenistic documents of μετὰ τὰ ἱερὰ καὶ τὰ βασιλικά. 68 The analogy with τὰ βασιλικά strongly indicates that τὰ ἱερά refers to sacred business, not to sacrifices. Furthermore, a consequence of Harris' interpretation of μετὰ τὰ ἱερά would be that all the attestations of bringing a matter or a person before the people πρώτῳ μετὰ τὰ ἱερά69 would entail that in these cases a profane matter would be dealt with before whatever sacred business there might be on the agenda.
Next, Canevaro wonders how at Dem. 24.20 ἐπειδὰν εὔξηται ὁ κῆρυξ can be followed by ἐπιχειροτονίαν ποιεῖν τῶν νόμων. "If Hansen is right [about τἀ ἱερά] then the document details a practice that has no parallel anywhere in the Greek world: setting an item in the agenda placed before the 'sacred business' ".70
The problem with this argument is the assumption that each and every meeting of the Assembly had sacred business on the agenda. According to Ath. Pol. 43.4-6 a number of specific matters are dealt with in two of the four ekklesiai held in a prytany: ἡ ἐκκλησία κυρία in which the obligatory items on the agenda included a vote on the archai, eisangeliai, reports on confiscated property and some other matters and an ekklesia which had ἱκετηρίαι on the agenda. The remaining two ekklesiai are about other mattes, namely ἐν αἷς κελεύουσιν οἱ νόμοι τρία μὲν ἱερῶν χρηματίζειν, τρία δὲ κήρυξιν καὶ πρεσβείαις, τρία δὲ ὁσίων. Now, there is no evidence that sacred business invariably had to be transacted in the other two ekklesiai, (i.e. the ekklesia kyria and the ekklesia about hiketeriai) and accordingly it is not suspicious that at Dem. 24.20 ἐπιχειροτονίαν ποιεῖν follows immediately after ἐπειδὰν εὔξηται ὁ κῆρυξ without the mention of any sacred business to be dealt with.
(2)71 Canevaro's second point deals with the expression ἐπιχειροτονίαν ποιεῖν τῶν νόμων (Dem. 24.20). He repeats what he noted before: "The verb ποιεῖν is in the active, but there is no subject for it. The subject should be the proedroi or the people. Even if we assume that the subject is understood, the expression is nevertheless unparalleled."72 In his new article he writes: "On the one hand, when at Demosth. or. 24.25 we find the verb ποιεῖν, its subject is the nomoi (as Hansen recognizes), not the demos or the proedroi as understood in the document, and its object is διαχειροτονίαν, which in Hansen's own reconstruction is not equivalent to the ἐπιχειροτονία […]. On the other hand, when we find at Demosth. or. 24.26 τοὺς νόμους ἐπεχειροτονήσετε, with the Athenians (i.e. the demos) as the subject, there is no ποιεῖν, and the expression with the verb ἐπιχειροτονεῖν is, unlike that of the document, consistent with the use of (ἐπι-or δια-)χειροτονεῖν (or cognates) in the inscriptional record."73 On the contrary, in my article I point out that neither ἐπιχειροτονία nor ὲπιχειροτονεῖν is attested in Athenian inscriptions of the Classical period,74 that in literary sources it is used synonymously with διαχειροτονία,75 and that the proper parallel to the infinitive ποιεῖν at Dem. 24.20 is the imperative-infinitives attested in the law about silver coins: τὸ ἀργύριον δέχεσθαι τὸ ἀττικόν translated "Attic silver shall be accepted"76 and in the law about taxing Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros: τὴν δωδεκάτην πωλεῖν τὴν ἐν Λήμνωι καὶ Ἰμβρωι καὶ Σκύρωι καὶ τὴν πεντεκοντὴν σίτο, translated "sell the tax of one twelfth at Lemnos, Scyros and Imbros and the tax of one fiftieth, in grain"77 and I responded that no subject is needed. Similarly in the document at 24.20: διαχειροτονίαν ποιεῖν τῶν νόμων where the subject to be understood is not δῆμος, but νόμος: "conduct a διαχειροτονία about the laws."
(3)78 In this section Canevaro discusses the four categories of nomoi in the document at 24.20. He finds faults with the grammar of the phrase: πρῶτον μὲν περὶ τῶν βουλευτικῶν, δεύτερον δὲ τῶν κοινῶν, εἶτα οἳ κεῖνται τοῖς ἐννέα ἄρχουσιν, εἶτα τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν. I can accept the passage as it stands. First, the initial περί is not repeated but governs the entire period. For περί governing five consecutive participles in the genitive case, see Dem. 24.40. Second a demonstrative τούτων is twice understood before εἶτα, and the omission of a demonstrative before a relative is a common phenomenon.79 I admit however that it is odd -but not impossible -to have the naked genitive τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν instead of ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀρχαῖς agreeing with οἳ κεῖνται τοῖς ἐννέα ἄρχουσιν or περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν (agreeing with περὶ τῶν βουλευτικῶν).80 According to Canevaro "[…] this is the most serious difficulty, that if the laws of Athens were effectively categorised, conceptualised, and reviewed every year in a very important procedure of ἐπιχειροτονία τῶν νόμων, according to the categories cited in the document, then we should expect to find these categories mentioned in the orators and in other sources as the organisational principle of the laws of the city. And yet none of these categories features anywhere in our sources […] ."81 But that is not true. In the document at Dem. 24.20 the four basic categories mentioned in the law are: laws associated with the boule, common laws (koinoi nomoi), laws associated with the nine archontes and laws associated with the other archai. We do not know which laws were included in the category hoi koinoi nomoi. But for the other three categories the defining criterion was indisputably the magistrates involved and responsible for bringing the relevant cases to court. Similarly in an important article by Harris82 there is a section entitled "The Organ- 466) and I still do. We have to remember that in this context the term "proce-isation of Athenian Laws" in which he quotes and analyses two sources: Hypereides' speech "Against Euxenippos" 5-6: and the Demosthenic speech "Against Lakritos" 47-48:
"In a speech written for a case of eisangelia Hypereides (Euxenippus 5-6) says that the laws are enacted to deal with different offenses, then proceeds to list the offense and the magistrate responsible for each one.
[…] The basic idea expressed in this passage is that laws are grouped by substantive categories, and actions are assigned to magistrates on the basis of their jurisdiction over certain areas defined in substantive terms. The basileus is responsible for religious matters; the Eponymous Archon looks after family matters; and the thesmothetai accept cases about illegal decrees."83 Similarly, in Dem. 35.47-48 the various ways to get justice are grouped according to the various types of offence and the magistrates who in each case preside over the court: the hendeka, the archon, the basileus, the polemarch and the strategoi. Harris concludes: "In this passage too the jurisdiction of different officials is determined by the nature of the substantive offense; there is almost no mention of judicial procedures."84 Harris emphasises the substantive aspect of Athenian laws against a number of scholars (including myself)85 who stressed the procedural aspect and underestimated the substantive.86 Harris also argued (14 n. 28) that the document (24.20-23) groups the laws by the parts of the Athenian polis (the Council, public laws, the nine archons, other magistrates), not by procedures.87 I agree: the Athenians had a law about βλάβη, another about αἰκία, a third about ὕβρις, they did not have a law about the δίκη βλάβης, another about the δίκη αἰκείας, and a third about the γραφὴ ὕβρεως (Dem. 21.35). The only law in which the type of action was an essential criterion is the εἰσαγγελτικὸς νόμος.88 But I take the subdivision of laws according to the magistrate responsible for dure" is used in two different meanings. It can refer to the type of action used to bring an offender to court, or it can refer to the magistrate who accepted the cases and presided over the court. having a matter brought before the Assembly or a dikasterion or the nomothetai to be a procedural criterion, and also like Harris I point out that "since each magistrate had, up to a point, a competence determined on a material basis, the formal division of the laws did correspond roughly with a material order; thus family and inheritance laws all came under the archon, much of the law about religion came under the king archon, and the polemarch must have had the whole law relating to metics and other non-Athenians."89 (4) Canevaro repeats his view that at 24.20 "the clause κατὰ τοὺς νόμους τοὺς κειμένους is otiose, as the procedure created by the document is supposed to be a new one, and therefore there are no relevant existing laws outside of the document to be followed"90. My reply was and still is that "the reference to the laws in force ensured that the law about the epicheirotonia ton nomon did not involve other innovations than those actually mentioned in the law"91. As a parallel I can refer to another instance of κατὰ τοὺς νόμους τοὺς κειμένους which is "otiose" if we adopt Canevaro's interpretation: ὅ τε πατὴρ ἡμῶν, ἐπειδὴ ἐγενόμεθα, εἰς τοὺς φράτερας ἡμᾶς εἰσήγαγεν, ὀμόσας κατὰ τοὺς νόμους τοὺς κειμένους ἦ μὴν ἐξ ἀστῆς καὶ ἐγγυητῆς γυναικὸς εἰσάγειν.92
(5) The next issue is how to interpret τὴν τελευταίαν τῶν τριῶν ἐκκλησιῶν in the document compared with μετὰ ταῦτα […] τὴν τρίτην ἀπέδειξεν ἐκκλησίαν [sc. ὁ νόμος] in Demosthenes' paraphrase at 24.25.93 I believe that what I wrote in my article about τὴν τρίτην ἐκκλησίαν in Demosthenes' paraphrase at 24.25 still stands.94 There is no evidence to support Canevaro's contention that τὴν τρίτην ἐκκλησίαν means "the third ekklesia following the initial one"95. True, in inscriptions εἰς τὴν πρώτην ἐκκλησίαν means "in the next ekklesia"96, but there is no attestation of εἰς τὴν δευτέραν or τρίτην ἐκκλησίαν. Canevaro argues that "the paraphrase at Demosth. Or. 24.25 talks about τὴν τρίτην […] ἐκκλησίαν, which should be read as the third Assembly meeting after the initial one"97. But if that is what Demosthenes intends to tell his audience, he should have said, e.g., τὴν τρίτην ἐκκλησίαν μετ' ἐκείνην98 or ἀπ' ἐκείνης99. If, however -for the sake of argument -we assume that Demosthenes does refer to the third following ekklesia, i.e. the fourth in the prytany, the same interpretation may apply to τὴν τελευταίαν τῶν τριῶν ἐκκλησιῶν in the document, meaning the last of the three following Assemblies, in which case there is no reason on this particular point to question the authenticity of the document. Canevaro adds that his interpretation "is confirmed by Demosth. or. 20.94, which states that the bills have to be read πολλάκις in the Assembly, which cannot indicate once or twice, but at least three times"100. So both according to Canevaro and the document101 the ekklesia in which appointment of nomothetai is discussed is the last in the first prytany. In any case according to Demosthenes' paraphrase the third ekklesia is the meeting in which the people consider the terms on which the nomothetai shall sit.102 It is not the meeting when the nomothetai are appointed and the dates of their sessions are fixed. The number of bills published before the eponymous heroes after the first ekklesia in Hekatombaion must have varied from year to year and so must the number of bills submitted in the course of the year. Consequently the session in which the nomothetai were appointed must take place in the second prytany or perhaps even later,103 and accordingly the proposed laws were indeed read out to the people and debated several times, as stated by Demosthenes at 20.94104 and confirmed by Deinarchos at 1.42 where he tells the jurors that at every ekklesia Demosthenes suggested changes to his bill about a revision of the trierarchic law.
In collaboration with F. Mitchel I suggested that when the trial of Timokrates took place the Athenians convened three ekklesiai in a prytany and that the Aristotelian system of four ekklesiai had not yet been introduced. The earliest attestation of having four ekklesiai in a prytany is in the eighth prytany of 347/346.105 D. M. Lewis addressed the problem in "M. H. Hansen and the Athenian Ecclesia", unpublished paper read at "The Norman Baynes Annual Meeting of UK Ancient Historians" on 25 September 1984. He agrees with Mitchel and me on the interpretation of Dem. 24.21 and 25: both passages show that in the first prytany only three ekklesiai were convened, not four. He objected, however, that it is unwarranted to generalise and assume as we do, that only three ekklesiai were held in all ten prytanies. Hekatombaion was, according to Lewis a month with extraordinarily many festival days, and thus the first prytany was probably exceptional by having only three ekklesiai instead of four. The number of festival days in Hekatombaion was in fact above average, since the Panathenaia probably included all the days from the 23rd to the 30th.106 Furthermore, in all of Hekatombaion the only meeting day of the ekklesia attested in our sources is the eleventh.107 (6) "[…] the document uses the bouleutic calendar at the beginning but the festival calendar at the end, and the festival calendar is never found in Attic decrees and laws of the late-fifth and fourth century before 341/340. This, I concluded, is strong evidence against the authenticity of the document."108 It is true that no decree or law is dated by the festival calendar before 341/340; but the dates given at the beginning and the end of the document at Dem. 24.20-23 are not the dates of the law. They prescribe when to conduct the ἐπιχειροτονία τῶν νόμων (Dem. 24.20) and when to appoint advocates to defend the laws rejected in consequence of the ἐπιχειροτονία (Dem. 24.23). For a similar fifth-century reference in a decree to first the bouleutic and then the civil calendar, see Thuc. 4.118.11-13.109 Furthermore, Nomoi are less meticulous than psephismata about recording dates. In the inscribed texts of some laws passed by the nomothetai there is no information whatsoever about the date on which the law was passed (IG II 2 244, Rhodes -Osborne 2003, 25 and 26). The only nomoi passed by the nomothetai that record both the prytany and the day of the prytany are Timokrates' law at Dem. 24.39-40 and 71 from 353/352, IG II 2 140 from 333/332 and the unpublished law Agora no. I 7495. Epikrates' law from 337/336 records the prytany (the ninth) but not the day of the prytany (Rhodes -Osborne 2003, 79). None of the laws passed by the nomothetai record the month and the day of the month. But all laws were, of course, dated and in Diokles' law (Dem. 24.42)110 the principal clause is that a nomos takes effect on the day it is passed unless a specific date for its coming into effect is stipulated in the law itself. And the secretary of the boule is instructed to add this provision to the laws in force. So the authoritative texts of the laws which included information about the day they were passed were not the copies inscribed on stelai but the texts filed in the Metroon, and it is to these texts the secretary of the boule has to add the provision about when the law comes into force.111 (7) Canevaro noted in his analysis "that if, in accordance with Demosthenes' paraphrase, proposals for laws are posted after the initial Assembly meeting at which the Athenians vote on whether new proposals should be made, then there is no way for the Athenians to know at the initial meeting what contradictory laws will be challenged, and therefore to appoint qualified advocates to defend them, as the document prescribes. The provision of the document that five citizens should be elected on the 11 th of Hekatombaion to defend the laws that are challenged is therefore nonsensical."112 No, it is only nonsesical on the assumption that the document is a forgery. If as a result of the epicheirotonia, e.g. two nomoi were rejected it would make sense right away to appoint synegoroi to defend them when they were debated in the following ekklesiai and before the nomothetai.113 The bills that in the period after the ekklesia were posted before the eponymoi would all be alternatives to these two nomoi.
In this case the presumption is that at the ekklesia on 11 Hekatombaion the demos must have elected synegoroi to defend the law about the Panathenaia which Timokrates and his associates would have amended. But what happened was that the elected synegoroi came to oppose the nomos proposed and carried by Timokrates,114 a bill that had nothing to do with the organisation of the Panathenaia which Timokrates and his associates had attacked and would have replaced with an alternative bill.
(8) The term used by Demosthenes to designate the advocates elected to defend a law that had been voted down by the demos in the epicheirotonia ton nomon or contested by a graphe nomon me epitedion theinai is either synegoroi (Dem. 24.36) or syndikoi (Dem. 20.146), but in the document at Dem. 20.23 they are called synapologoumenoi. This term is found in the orators about advocates who support the defendant voluntarily but not about elected advocates.115 Canevaro infers that the use of the term in the document at Dem. 24.23 discloses that the document is a late forgery.116 That is a possibility, but no more than that. The fact that Demosthenes can use two different words on two different occasions shows that there was not one uniquely proper word to be used here. 
